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Abstract Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of
the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that
their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of
this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between
the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected
or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put
weight on the explanatory role of the body itself or body representations. We further
analyse how and to what extent body representations can be said to be embodied.
Finally, we give an overview of the full volume articulated around foundational issues
(How should we define the notion of embodiment? To what extent and in what sense is
embodiment compatible with representationalism? To what extent and in what sense are
sensorimotor approaches similar to behaviourism?) and their applications in several
cognitive domains (perception, concepts, selfhood, social cognition).
Cognitive science of the last 20 years has seen an increasing focus on the body.
Embodied cognitive science has become an industry. However, its unity is question-
able (Clark 2008a, b), and its status as a competitor or ancestor to traditional cognitive
science is unclear (for divergent views compare Thagard 2005; Varela et al. 1991).
Still, a worry shared by many is that classical cognitive science puts too much of the
mind’s cognitive resources in the head. In its most radical form, this worry leads to a
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rejection of the traditional notion of internal representation. Representations are
thought to be inefficient because they are computationally too costly; they are thought
to be unnecessary because real biological systems dynamically interact with that
which was traditionally thought to be represented (Chemero 2009; Gallagher 2008;
Thelen and Smith 1994; Turvey and Carello 1995; Van Gelder 1995). This latter
claim may be especially true of the body (Kinsbourne 1995, 2002); modifying an
expression coined by Brooks (1991), perhaps “the [body] is its own best model”. The
amount of information received from the body is quantitatively superior to that
received from any environmental object: not only can we see and touch it, we also
receive a continuous flow of proprioceptive and interoceptive inputs. As Merleau-
Ponty (1945/1962) notes, the body presents a highly special feature compared to any
other object in the world: it never leaves us; why do we then need an internal
representation of the body? If real biological systems will only know what they need
to in order to get the job done (Clark 1989, pp. 64–66), is the body really something
that the brain needs to “know” in this sense?
In notable ignorance of questions such as these, body representations have
become the stock in trade of much recent cognitive psychology, neuroscience,
and empirically sensitive phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Certainly,
arguments in favour of retaining representations within the cognitive scientist’s
toolkit can be levied in favour of the increasing frequency in which body
representations are posited. But a more poignant (and perhaps fruitful) point of focus,
independent of the general issue of whether cognitive systems represent tout court, is
whether positing body representations actually undermines the explanatory role of the
body, in the same manner in which positing representations of the world has been
thought to undermine the explanatory role of the environment (cf. Brooks 1991).
Alternatively, perhaps certain types of representation are so closely dependent upon
the non-neural body (i.e. the body besides the brain), that their involvement in a
cognitive task implicates the non-neural body itself. The relationship between
embodied theories and body representations remains obscure, yet an increasing number
of researchers appeal explicitly to body representation and embodiment interchangeably
(Arzy et al. 2006; Chatterjee 2010; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2010, 2011; Glenberg
2010; Goldman and de Vignemont 2009; Marasco et al. 2011; Meteyard et al. 2012;
Newport et al. 2010; Pezzulo et al. 2011). We believe the time is ripe to explore
lines of tension and complement that might hold between these notions.
1 Strong and Weak Embodiment
In an early, somewhat field-defining treatment Clark (1997, pp. 148–149) dis-
tinguished “radical embodied cognitive science”, with its paradigm-shifting whole-
sale denial of representational cognitive scientific explanation (Kelso 1995; Port and
van Gelder 1995; Thelen and Smith 1994; Van Gelder 1995; though see Chemero
2009, pp. 28–33), from a less radical embodied cognitive science that liberally
employs both representational and non-representational explanatory schemes (Clark
1997; Wilson 2004). The core issue between ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ embodied
cognitive science is not between contrasting notions of embodiment per se; rather, it
concerns the presence or absence of representations in cognitive systems. There
A.J.T. Alsmith, F. Vignemont
are, however, at least two notions of embodiment operative in the literature. According
to Prinz, to say of some cognitive phenomenon, or some aspect of mind, that it is
embodied, means either that it “depends on the possession and use of a body, not just a
brain” or that it depends on “mental representations or processes that relate to the body”
(2009, p. 420). Though prima facie these ideas might seem “related in spirit” (Clark
1997, p. 242), note that only the former (sc. dependence upon the body) threatens
to rock the neurocentric ‘applecart’ of modern cognitive science (Block 2007).
To keep track of this difference, we will call any view that gives a clear explanatory
role to the body a ‘strongly embodied’ view (or ‘strong embodiment’); by contrast,
we will call any view that gives a clear explanatory role to representations of the
body, whilst not also giving a clear explanatory role to the body itself, a ‘weakly
embodied’ view (or ‘weak embodiment’).1
In contrast to the distinction between radical andmoderate embodied cognitive science,
the strong/weak dichotomy is really is a distinction between different conceptions of
embodiment. Moreover, strong embodiment is perfectly compatible with the pluralistic
ends of moderate theorists: a strongly embodied view can still appeal to representations,
even representations of the body, provided that the body itself is given a clear explanatory
role. Still, this bare possibility makes it no less important to be clear whether it is reference
to the body itself, or representation of the body, that is thought to aid an explanation of
some cognitive phenomenon; for in certain cases there might be two competing accounts
of the same phenomenon, one appealing to weak embodiment and the other appealing to
strong embodiment. Equivocation in this regard is easily invited by the use of ambiguous
terms like ‘body schema’. Thus, for instance, Menary writes: “The body is integrated with
the environment through its body schemas, which are unconscious sensorimotor programs
for action” (Menary 2010, p. 233). In the mainstream neuroscientific usage, the term
‘body schema’ typically refers to an internal representational process of integrating
sensorimotor information to enable holistic motor control (de Vignemont 2010),
rather akin to Menary’s “sensorimotor programs”, implicating weak embodiment at
most (cf. also Clark 2008c, pp. 37–39). By contrast, Shaun Gallagher’s phenomeno-
logically inspired use of the term refers to a strongly embodied sensorimotor process,
strongly embodied in so far as it is clearly intended to include peripheral sensory
organs and effectors in the channelling and structuring of information flow (Gallagher
2005a, b). This is a clear instance in which the contrast between strong embodiment
and body representation presents a real tension. For it seems that two divergent
referents of a term are each singled out as providing adequate explanation of a
phenomenon. In the mainstream neuroscientific usage, the body schema qua body
representation serves to explain the phenomenon of holistic bodily movement; in the
1 Our use of the term “strong embodiment” is similar to that in Dempsey & Shani (forthcoming) article,
though his central concern is with distinguishing strong embodiment (or “strong embodied cognitive
science”) from the form of extended functionalism proposed by Clark (2008a, b) (see also Jacob, this
volume). The term “strong embodiment” is also used in Chatterjee (2010) and Meteyard et al. (2012), but in
a manner wholly divergent from both Dempsey & Shani’s and our own. In both Chatterjees and Meteyard
et al.’s discussion, a “strongly embodied” view is committed to the claim that conceptual processing activates
precisely the neural perceptual and motor structures that were engaged in the original perceptual and motor
experiences involved in instances of the relevant concepts; views are “disembodied” or more “weakly
embodied” to the extent that they depart from such a commitment. On our use of the strong/weak distinction
(and likely, Shani’s), both Chatterjee and Meteyard et al.’s reviews limit their scope to weak embodiment.
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phenomenologically inspired approach, the body schema qua strongly embodied
process serves to explain the phenomenon of holistic bodily movement.
2 Weak Embodiment and Disembodiment
Reviews of the “embodiment” literature abound, but few keep track of the very basic
difference between strong and weak embodiment. Some focus exclusively on weak
embodiment (e.g., Mahon and Caramazza 2005), others focus on more general
themes in which the ideas are clearly “related in spirit”; Margaret Wilson’s (2002)
timely and widely cited review is exemplary in this latter respect. She distinguishes
no less than six themes that characterise the embodied cognitive science movement:
(i) cognition is situated; (ii) time-pressured; (iii) we off-load cognitive work onto the
environment; (iv) the environment is part of the cognitive system; (v) cognition is for
action; (vi) offline cognition is body based. Most of these themes do not heed the
distinction at hand. Rather for the most part they emphasise the putatively “situated”,
“distributed” or “extended” nature of cognition. The principal issues here do not
concern embodiment per se, rather they concern the constraints and opportunities
posed by the environment and our active engagement with it, and the implications
that this might have for the nature and extent to which internal representation of the
environment is required. For instance, Wilson’s fifth theme (cognition is for action)
might seem prima facie to bear upon a specific notion of embodiment, but in fact the
main focus of work in this area is that the manner in which cognitive systems
represent the world is much more sparse, task-specific and fleeting than might
classically have been thought (Ballard et al. 1997; Churchland et al. 1994;
Glenberg 1997). The explanatory role of the body, or indeed its representation, is
hardly clear; if indeed it is implicated at all.
In fact the only theme in Wilson’s review that actually touches on either strong or
weak embodiment (the latter in particular) is that indicated by her claim that “off-line
cognition is body based”. She considers the example of gradually internalising a well-
known cognitive scaffold, counting on one’s fingers; perhaps the familiar articulated
movements could be replaced by mere twitches, and those might even be replaced by
covert motor activation. She concludes: “If this kind of mental activity [sc. covert
motor activation] can be employed successfully to assist a task such as counting, a
new vista of cognitive strategies opens up” (Wilson 2002 p. 633). The possibility of
such a gradual internalisation opens up a range of possibilities for representations of
the body to play the same functional role in a task as the overt bodily movements
internalised. Moreover, research in this line–on memory (Glenberg 1997), conceptual
understanding (Lakoff and Johnson 1999), and the relationship between conceptual
processing and sensorimotor processing (Barsalou 1999; Gallese and Lakoff 2005)–
certainly comes closest to addressing the more abstract forms of cognition that were
thought to be troublesome for embodied cognitive science. But on Wilson’s gloss this
is all gained precisely in virtue of the cognitive system’s ability to “decouple” from
the body itself (Wilson 2002 p. 633).
As a further example of such decoupling, consider a few observations from the
study of intentional bodily movement. In many biological systems (humans especial-
ly) peripheral signals specifying the dynamics of bodily movement are ambiguous
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and cannot travel fast enough to provide timely influence on central motor processes
(Latash 2008, pp. 258–260). Nevertheless, smooth sensorimotor control is achieved.
According to a well-established, though still controversial (see e.g. Beer 2009; Kelso
2002; Ostry and Feldman 2003; Turvey 1990) line of research in motor control, the
explanation is that the brain encodes a model of the musculoskeletal system, using
copies of the outflowing motor signals to compute the likely sensory feedback that
would be generated by the movements specified (see e.g. Desmurget and Grafton
2000). This enables the system to not only accommodate signal delay and unreliabil-
ity, but also explore likely changes in the causal process without any obligation to
implement such changes. If this is right, then skilful sensorimotor engagement is
enabled precisely in virtue of driving a model (often known as a forward model, cf.
Miall and Wolpert 1996) of the causal process, alongside or in absence of the actual
control process.
This brief sketch frames a set of ideas shared by many psychological, neuropsy-
chological and computational neuroscientific treatments of motor control (Davidson
and Wolpert 2005; Jeannerod 1997; Wolpert and Ghahramani 2000). The central idea
here can be stated more abstractly in simple control-theoretic terms. Some control
systems have only two components: a controller and a plant. Coupling of controller
and plant enables a feed-back control system in which the controller receives signals
from the output of the plant and sends control signals according to the relative
disparity between output and target state. But when feedback is gappy or unreliable,
or when the system needs to explore possibilities without implementing them, a third
component is necessary: a model of the plant. This further complexity to the
control architecture enables further possibilities for interaction within the sys-
tem; the control system can interact with the plant itself, or it can interact with
an internal model. With respect to biological systems enabling cognitive states,
this second possibility has two rather significant implications. The first is that
interactions between the controller and the internal model occur within the
brain as a self-contained system (Grush 2003, p. 81). The second is that by covertly
running a model of the motor control process, the brain (sans body) might generate
sensory and motor information to support a variety of cognitive functions (Grush
2004; Hesslow 2002; Jeannerod 2006; Kosslyn et al. 1993; Wexler et al. 1998). These
latter ideas all seem familiar on the notion of weak embodiment. But note that they
are but a hair’s breadth away from the (also familiar) neurocentric idea that cognitive
states are exclusively realised in neural hardware.
Indeed, within the control-theoretic framework a neurocentric conclusion
might be reached by similar but subtly different means. Describing cognitive
systems in control-theoretic terms might be especially desirable in allowing one
to categorise distinct components and explore quantitative and even qualitative
differences in the dynamics of their interaction. From this perspective, one
might see differences in “speed of information flow (i.e. bandwidth), and the
degree and kind of coupling” as features that distinguish dynamics internal to the
brain (i.e. between controller and model) from intra-extra-neural dynamics (i.e. between
controller and plant) (Eliasmith 2008, p. 150). If these differences turned out to be
important for a particular cognitive function, this might be one basis on which to
identify the realisers of that function in a manner that excluded non-neural elements
(Clark 2009, pp. 983–987).
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3 Action-Orientated Body Representation
The potential for internalisation and decoupling has frequently served in a quasi-
evolutionary argument for describing a system as representational (Clark and Grush
1999, p. 7; Dennett 1996, pp. 88–90; Metzinger 2003, pp. 47–49; O'Brien and Opie
2004, pp. 213–276; Smith 1996, pp. 213–276). We hope to have shown that to
claim that certain representations are related to the body is one thing, but to explicitly
articulate the relation to the body, such that the body nevertheless plays an explan-
atory role, is another thing entirely. One class of representation thought by many
to be particularly suited to embodied cognitive science is that of ‘action-centred
representation’. Accordingly, a theoretically interesting possibility here would be to
explore whether certain representations of the body could be classified as action-
centred. But in order for that to be a viable possibility, one needs an answer to the
question: what makes a representation action-centred?
We use the term action-centred representation to refer to a family of alternatives to
traditional conceptions of mental representation: skill-based representation (Evans
1982; Grush 1998), pushmi-pullyu representations (Millikan 1995), action-orientated
representations (Clark 1997; Mandik 2005), non-conceptual representations (Cussins
1990). The common asset of these various notions is that they incorporate intuitions
and objections raised by radical embodied cognitive science, but within a represen-
tationalist framework. However, despite the frequent invocation of action-centred
representation (or something similar), frustratingly little work has been devoted to the
articulation of the core features that distinguish it from other forms of representation.
We believe, at minimum, that action-centred representations ought to be distinguished
from the idea that bodily movement itself can instantiate a process of representing
(Rowlands 2006), for the principal attraction of action-centred representation is its
association with “partial” or “minimal-memory” schemes of internal representation
(Ballard et al. 1997; Clark 1997; Wheeler 2005). Furthermore, we believe that the
role of representations in action is not a matter of all or nothing. Even highly
cognitive states at the personal level can be causal antecedents to action (or at least
explanatorily implicated by an action). Let us consider for a moment the following
example. A person goes to the kitchen, and intends to do so because she believes that
there is chocolate there. It would be tenuous to say that her belief is embodied
simply because it plays a causal/explanatory role in her action. Here, and
arguably elsewhere, the connection between representation and action is a
matter of degree; it is a matter of how direct or immediate the transition is
from representation to action. In the case of the person’s chocolate belief, the
format is not directly exploitable to guide her action. Furthermore, her belief
can be used not only to guide her behaviour but also in abstract reasoning. As
such, it is not intrinsically action-centred; its function depends on the consumer’s use.
Finally, one may note that the person’s belief does not suffice to trigger her
action. It has no motivational dimension, unlike an intention. It does not tell
her what is to be done. This brief overview already reveals several related
candidates for individuating criteria of action-centred representations: format
directly exploitable by action, exclusive use for action, intrinsic action-relatedness,
motivational force. Let us focus on a single standard criterion for distinguishing different
types of representations, namely, direction of fit.
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A classic dichotomy in the philosophical literature is between world-to-mind and
mind-to-world direction of fit. In the former case, representations are descriptive states
with truth conditions. Belief is a typical example at the personal level. In the latter case,
representations are directive states with success conditions. The typical example is then
desire. The problem with this dichotomy is that it leaves the way the world is described
and the way one acts upon the world quite separated. The notion of pushmipulliu
representation (hereafter PPR) introduced by Millikan (1995), also sometimes referred
as action-orientated representation (Clark 1997), aims to palliate this deficiency.
PPRs combine two directions of fit, from mind-to-world and from world-to-mind.
They have thetic and telic structure (Humberstone 1992). They have both truth
conditions and success conditions. PPR is more primitive than the combination of a
directive representation and a descriptive representation because one has no utility
without the other. A typical example can be found in representation of affordances
(Millikan 1995). They describe how the environment is arranged while informing how
one can move within this environment. There is no need to translate descriptive
information into directive information. The same may be said of any visuomotor
representation (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003), and of agentive experiences (Bayne 2010).
Now, one way proponents of “embodiment” might want to go is to propose the
existence of bodily PPRs, defined as follows: a bodily PPR is any representation that
encodes bodily properties in a format that is directly exploitable to guide action.
Certainly, the mere fact that some cognitive task involves bodily PPRs hardly
implicates a particularly strong notion of embodiment, if it implicates the embodi-
ment of cognition at all. But to infer from the fact that a system is representational that
its realisers are solely neural is to confuse strong embodiment with a radical anti-
representationalist cognitive science. A natural question then is this: In what way is
strong embodiment compatible with the idea that the brain represents its body?
4 Strong Embodiment and Embodied Representation
It has recently been argued that certain properties of internal information bearing
structures distinguish them as the kind of representational structures able to support
cognitive states (Adams and Aizawa 2001, 2008). Some even go so far as to argue
that demarcating the brain as the realiser of cognitive states is adequately justified by
the brain’s ability to represent, and thus decouple from that which it represents. But
from this fact are we entitled to go as far as Grush, who provocatively writes: “The
brain can silently contemplate, dream, plan, all as a matter of a play of
representations–pretty much everything Descartes thought the mind could do even in
absence of the world” (Grush 2003, p. 87); or indeed, in the absence of a body?
Most of the conceptual work involved in rejecting a neurocentric account of cogni-
tion has (perhaps too often) been in the service of arguing for the blanket “extension” of
cognition. Work in this area is characterised by two “waves” (Menary 2010; Sutton
2010). The first-wave extrapolated functionalist intuitions to argue that whenever one
confronts non-neural elements functioning in the same manner as neurocognitive
processes, those elements are part of a cognitive process that extends beyond the
brain; the famed “parity principle” (Clark and Chalmers 1998). From the functionalist
perspective that first-wave arguments assume, “the body, insofar as it is cognitively
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significant, turns out to be itself defined by a certain complex functional role” (Clark
2008b, p. 56). However, parity arguments might fall short of establishing that a
cognitive phenomenon is necessarily strongly embodied, if the body is conceived as
“just one element in a kind of equal-partners dance between brain, body and world”
(ibid.). Clearly this “cognitively significant” functional role might be played by the
body, its representation, or some aspect of the local environment. Accordingly, it
hardly follows that any view on which cognition is extended is also a view on which
cognition is (necessarily, at least) strongly embodied.
Similar problems do not arise with the second-wave, which shifts the focus from
“parity” to “complementarity”. In complementarity views, non-neural elements find
their place in a cognitive system in virtue of both being coordinated with neural
processes and providing a different kind of functionality from the neural processes
involved. This is still broadly compatible with conceiving of the mind in terms of
cognitive functions, but it puts pressure on the idea that those functions can be realised
by just any old (neural or environmental) material. Interestingly, note that complemen-
tarity arguments might well resist the lines of argument sketched in the previous section
which some believe to undermine the claim that cognitive systems are embodied. For
example, one cannot conclude that non-neural elements are not part of the cognitive
system for the mere fact that there are distinctly neural information processing profiles
(contra Clark 2009; Eliasmith 2008). For it might be precisely in virtue of instantiat-
ing a different information processing profile from neural hardware that the body
serves a useful role in the cognitive system. Neither can one conclude that cognitive
systems are neurally bound from the premise that certain cognitive functions are
enabled by internalising sensorimotor information and decoupling from its source
(contra Grush 2003; Wilson 2002). Here again, a means of singling out the body as
genuinely explanatory would be to show that the body itself is implementing a
distinct but complementary process to that provided by neural hardware. For instance,
Goldin-Meadow (1999) has argued that gestures might be such a case.
In short, it seems that complementarity arguments, as opposed to parity arguments,
are a more likely means to establish strong embodiment. These are surely not the only
two options though (see also R. Wilson and Foglia 2011); and indeed complementarity
arguments might not be sufficient in and of themselves. One worry might be that even
if in some cases the body does implement a complementary information processing
profile, there are still cases in which a decoupled system is able to instantiate the very
same cognitive process. In order to argue that, in such cases, said cognitive process is
still nevertheless strongly embodied, one might argue that the development and
maintenance of such a process is dependent upon some other process implemented
by the body. However, this kind of dependency is likely to be causal, as a product of
development or evolution, and strong claims made on this basis (especially as regards
the constitution of cognitive processes) remain controversial (for discussion see
Adams and Aizawa 2008; Hurley 2010; Shapiro 2010, Chapter 6).
5 Overview of the Volume
We turn now to an overview of the contributions to this special issue. One peculiarity
of this volume was that we were not looking for revised manifestos or dismissive
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criticisms. Rather, each contribution was made with a view to clarifying the concept
of embodiment, its productive value and contemporary worth in the study of mind,
and its relation to the emerging focus on body representation in contemporary
cognitive neuroscience. To this end, we encouraged innovative formats, including
debates between opposite views (see O’Regan & Block as well as Gallagher &
Povinelli) and synthesis of complementary perspectives (Candidi, Aglioti and
Haggard). The main focus of the volume was thus to address foundational issues
on embodied cognition.
How Should We Define the Notion of Embodiment? Alvin Goldman argues in
favour of the existence of bodily codes, which he considers to be the most
theoretically and empirically fruitful notion of embodiment. He defines a bodily
code as a class of representational format whose primary function is to repre-
sent one’s bodily states and which can be redeployed for representing other
things. The notion of redeployment in bodily format can also be found in
Candidi, Aglioti & Haggard under the label of embodiment3, which comes in
addition to two more basic notions of embodiment that appeal to bodily content,
rather than format: embodiment1 defined as the representation of the interoceptive
body; and embodiment2 defined as the representation of the multisensory body. On
the other hand, Pierre Jacob’s discussion focuses more on the explanatory role of the
body than on notions of embodiment per se. He explores two conceptions of
embodiment, one in which the explanatory role of the body is no different from that
of the local environment, and another that maintains a distinctive contribution is
provided by the body that distinguishes an embodied cognitive system from its
environment. He argues that the biggest challenge faced by the latter is the intuitive
idea that the body functions as a tool in cognitive tasks, which may lead to the same
objections as those levied at the extended mind hypothesis.
To What Extent and in What Sense is Embodiment Compatible with Representation-
alism? As already apparent from a quick overview of the definitions of embodiment,
some notions are clearly representational (see e.g., Goldman’s contribution or
Candidi, Aglioti & Haggard’s) but it is still a matter of debate whether the
explanatory role of the body is mediated by representations, and especially represen-
tations with a bodily content or format. Jacob’s discussion aims at showing the
failure of a weak body-centric computationalism. Cussins rejects ‘cold’ referential
theories of representation. However, he proposes an alternative type of representation,
endowed with what he calls ‘hot’ mediational content, which can explain embodied
skills such as action and navigation.
To What Extent and in What Sense Are Sensorimotor Approaches Similar to Behav-
iourism? Rather than appeal to the notion of bodily representations, one of the
dominant trends in the field of embodied cognition puts emphasis on the explanatory
role of action. The volume includes two of its main proponents, Kevin O’Regan and
Shaun Gallagher, who respectively defend an approach to perceptual awareness in
terms of sensorimotor laws and to social cognition in terms of sensorimotor skills.
However, a frequent objection to sensorimotor approaches is that they fall under the
same criticisms as behaviourism faced last century. For example, in his discussion
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with O’Regan, Ned Block raises the questions of dreaming and visual imagery with
the support of recent experimental evidence that cannot be easily explained in
sensorimotor terms. But O’Regan seems to escape some of the criticisms by accept-
ing (to some extent) involvement of the brain in his account of qualia. On the other
hand, Daniel Povinelli explicitly defends a behavioural interpretation of recent
evidence in developmental and evolutionary psychology. While his view may seem
at first sight closely related to Gallagher’s, their discussion reveals fundamental
disagreements. Both joint papers nicely illustrate the similarities, but also the dissim-
ilarities between sensorimotor approaches and behaviourism.
In addition to foundational issues, the volume covers a wide range of applications
of the concept of “embodiment” to several cognitive domains.
Embodied Perception The explanatory role of the body in perception is at the core of
both O’Regan & Block’s paper and Goldman’s paper. The former focuses more
specifically on visual qualia, what it is like to see, but also to imagine or to dream red.
Whereas according to O’Regan, a red quale (for example) cannot be understood
independently of a more holistic experience that is nomologically linked to a set of
actions, Block conceives of qualia in a more atomistic way, reducible to brain states.
On the other hand, Goldman’s paper focuses on the perception of certain spatial
properties, such as distance and slope. Goldman reviews recent evidence from
Dennis Proffitt’s lab to argue in favour of the involvement of off-line motor
simulation.
Embodied Concepts Arguments for and against the ‘concept empiricist’, ‘grounded
cognition’ movement are discussed in the contributions to this volume. Candidi,
Aglioti & Haggard suggest that somatomotor processes might be phylogenetically
and ontogenetically necessary for certain forms of simulation. Similarly, Weber &
Vosgerau argue for a moderate view, on which motor abilities are a condition on the
acquisition of action concepts. In doing so, they develop two simple criteria for
taxonomising the sense in which x might be “grounded” by y: x might be a
condition for the acquisition of y; or a condition for the constitution of y; or
both. Finally Jacob presents several conceptual challenges for concept empiricism
as a general approach to the nature of concepts, and further evaluates the relationship
between computationalism, the embodiment of conceptual processing and the extended
mind.
Embodied Self Candidi, Aglioti & Haggard describe the sense of body ownership
in terms of embodiment2; that is, as a multimodal representation of the body, which is
both interoceptive and exteroceptive. Farmer & Tsakiris’ contribution is more
ambitious, they claim to relate two concepts of selfhood, which are too often
considered independently: phenomenal selfhood and narrative selfhood. The authors
posit a form of bodily self-representation, which arguably bridges the two: a form of
body representation that facilitates the subject’s experience of itself as an object for
both itself and others.
Embodied Social Cognition Farmer & Tsakiris present a means of directing future
research into the nature of the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity.
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They suggest that a form of body representation encoding third-person perspectival
information about the subject’s own body is deeply tied to one’s understanding of others
as being able to perceive oneself. However, the most extensive treatment of social
cognition can be found inGallagher & Povinelli’s discussion. They first contrast their
respective views (Enactivism and the Behaviour Abstraction Hypothesis) with alter-
native views (Theory theory, Simulation theory and Behaviour-rule theory) in the
light of recent apparent evidence of mental abilities in young infants and chimpan-
zees. They then explore the differences between their two views: Gallagher empha-
sises pragmatic, meaningful aspects of our engagement with others; whereas
Povinelli takes a more computational view that emphasises selection and abstraction
of behavioural patterns.
We would like to thank the authors for their contributions, as well as
Roberto Casati and Paul Egré for their support and encouragement throughout
this adventure.
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